New Jersey\u27s Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act: An Innovative Approach To Environmental Regulation by Long, Kenneth G.
Volume 90 
Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 90, 
1985-1986 
10-1-1985 
New Jersey's Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act: An 
Innovative Approach To Environmental Regulation 
Kenneth G. Long 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Kenneth G. Long, New Jersey's Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act: An Innovative Approach To 
Environmental Regulation, 90 DICK. L. REV. 159 (1985). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol90/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
New Jersey's Environmental Cleanup
Responsibility Act: An Innovative
Approach To Environmental Regulation
[T]he state has an interest independent of and behind the
titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain
. . . . It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sover-
eign that the air over its territory should not be polluted ... ,
that the forests on its mountains, be they better or worse, and
whatever domestic destruction they have suffered, should not be
further destroyed or threatened . . ., that the crops and
orchards on its hills should not be endangered.'
I. Introduction
On September 23, 1983 New Jersey Governor Thomas H. Kean
signed into law the Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act
(ECRA).2 The Act is an innovative regulation,3 placing New Jersey
in the vanguard of a national environmental movement.' Although a
labyrinth of statutes and case law exists5 to aid in the war against
I. Justice Holmes made this statement in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S.
230, 237-38 (1907).
2. Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-6-13 (West
Supp. 1984-85) [hereinafter cited as ECRA]. The law became effective on December 31,
1983.
3. Most state and federal environmental legislation either regulates hazardous waste
transportation and storage methods or attempts to remedy the harm already caused by hazard-
ous waste pollution. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§
6901 to 6987 (1982 & Supp. 1984) (federal statute regulating transportation and disposal of
hazardous waste) [hereinafter cited as RCRAJ; Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 to 9657 (1982) (federal statute
creating "Superfund" to remedy effects of pollution) [hereinafter cited as CERCLA]; New
Jersey Solid Waste Management Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:IE-1-42 (West 1979 & Supp.
1984-85) (state statute regulating hazardous waste transport and disposal) [hereinafter cited
as SWMA]; New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-
23.1 l(a)-(z) (West 1982 & Supp. 1984-85) (state statute creating remedies for effects of pol-
lution) [hereinafter cited as Spill Act]. ECRA differs from these statutes in that it does not
remedy the effects of already existing pollution nor monitor hazardous waste transport and
disposal facilities. Instead, it requires that the transfer or closure of "industrial establish-
ments" be preconditioned upon cleanup of any hazardous substances on the site. See infra text
accompanying notes 134-51.
4. Schmidt, Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act: Another First For New
Jersey, 113 N.J.L.J. 1 (1984).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 28-96.
pollution, 6 ECRA is the first piece of legislation to address the haz-
ardous waste7 problem by regulating the transfer and closure8 of in-
dustrial establishments.9 The Act requires that, prior to transferring
or closing operations involving hazardous substances, industrial es-
tablishments submit to the New Jersey Department of Environmen-
tal Protection (NJDEP) either a cleanup plan"0 for the proper dispo-
sal of on-site hazardous substances" or a document proving that the
site is free of hazardous substances.
12
The New Jersey legislature sought to ensure that operators
would not simply abandon these substances. Thus, ECRA prevents
useful but hazardous substances from being transformed, through
neglect, into pollution.
A recent Congressional report noted that "[t]he massive
problems presented by hazardous substances and hazardous wastes
are quite novel and might even be regarded as unprecedented in
their magnitude and complexity."'" One federal official has attrib-
uted the waste problem to "a relative surplus of land, an economic
6. Pollution is defined as "[t]he contamination of soil, air and water by noxious sub-
stances and noises." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 605 (5th ed. 1983). This comment refers only
to pollution caused by improper disposal of hazardous waste.
7. "Hazardous waste" is defined in ECRA as "any amount of any waste substances
required to be reported to the Department of Environmental Protection on the special waste
manifest pursuant to [N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 26-.4] or as otherwise provided by law." N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-8(e). A less cryptic definition which is appropriate in the context of this
article is given in RCRA, 42 U.S.C.S. § 6903(5):
Hazardous wastes are defined as wastes whose quality, concentration, or physi-
cal, chemical, or infectious characteristics may (a) cause or significantly contrib-
ute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapaci-
tating, reversible illness; or (b) pose a potential hazard to human health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or oth-
erwise managed.
8. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
II. ECRA defines "hazardous substances" as
those elements and compounds, including petroleum products, which are defined
as such by the department, after public hearing, and which shall include, the list
of hazardous substances adopted by the Environmental Protection Agency pur-
suant to section 311 of the 'Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972' (33 U.S.C. § 1321) and the list of toxic pollutants designated by Con-
gress or the Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to section 307 of that
act (33 U.S.C. § 1317); except that sewage and sewage sludge shall not be con-
sidered as hazardous substances for the purposes of this act;...
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-8(d). For the purpose of this article it is not necessary to enumerate
those substances described in the federal provisions.
12. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
13. SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS. IN-
JURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES - ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL
REMEDIES IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 301(E) OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSE COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 BY THE "SUPERFUND" SECTION
301(c) STUDY GROUP (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as REPORT] (exhaustive discus-
sion of hazardous waste problem and related problems confronting federal and state environ-
mental enforcement agencies).
system which failed to incorporate environmental damages into prod-
uct costs, and ignorance of what was occurring underground at dis-
posal sites.""' Of the fifty-seven million tons of hazardous industrial
chemical wastes produced in the United States annually, an esti-
mated ninety percent is disposed of improperly.1 Estimates of the
number of hazardous waste disposal sites range from as few as
4,802, according to an industry-sponsored study,16 to as many as
50,000,11 according to a government study. 8 In many cases, govern-
ment officials have difficulty even locating dump sites. Although sites
are often long abandoned, few records date back to the time of aban-
donment. As a result, government investigators often must rely on
the word of industry representatives who may be antagonistic to offi-
cial inquiries.1 9
Nonetheless, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) estimates that 1.2 million Americans20 are currently
exposed to health hazards from hazardous dump sites.21 This expo-
sure problem is particularly severe in the heavily industrialized state
of New Jersey. The state's chemical and petroleum industries gener-
ate an estimated 3.7 to 4.6 million tons of hazardous waste annu-
14. Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomms. on
Environmental Pollution and Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and
Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1979) (statement of EPA Assistant Administrator
Thomas C. Jorling) [hereinafter cited as Joint Hearings]. See also Comment, An Analysis of
Common Law and Statutory Remedies For Hazardous Waste Injuries, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 117,
118 n.13 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Analysis].
15. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980). Fifty percent of hazardous waste is
disposed of in unlined surface lagoons; thirty percent is dumped in nonsecure landfills; ten
percent is spread on roads, dumped in sewers or incinerated. Thus, only ten percent is disposed
of properly. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVEL-
OPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL OUTLOOK 1980, 511 (1980).
16. REPORT, supra note 13, at 21.
17. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2D
SESS.. REPORT ON HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RE-
SOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT 1. (Comm. Print 1980).
18. This discrepancy is probably the result of improper survey techniques used in both
studies. REPORT, supra note 13 at 22.
19. Id. at 25.
20. See generally Leunet, Handling Hazardous Waste, ENVIRONMENT (1980). But see
REPORT, supra note 13, at 32 (questions accuracy of EPA estimates because there is inade-
quate data concerning the actual number of waste sites or danger from those sites).
21. Presently, there is no firm agreement about the manner in which the potential
hazards of waste sites, the risk of exposure and the potential health effects from exposure can
be determined. See Epidemiologists See Need For New Tools to Study Toxic Effects From
Waste Dumps, 5 CHEM. REG. REP., Nov. 6, 1981, at 887. See also Maugh, Biological Mark-
ersfor Chemical Exposure, 25 SCIENCE 643 (1981). Exposure to hazardous substances can
occur by means of (I) direct contact, (2) fire and explosion, (3) groundwater contamination
through leachate, (4) subsurface water contamination via runoff or overflow, (5) evaporation
and wind erosion, or (6) poison via the food chain. REPORT, supra note 13, at 27 (citing
Hazardous Waste Fact Sheet, EPA JOURNAL, Feb. 1979, at 12). The most common means of
human exposure is through groundwater. Over forty million people depend on untreated well
water for domestic supplies. Maugh, Just How Hazardous Are Waste Dumps?, 215 SCIENCE
490 (1982).
ally,22 making New Jersey the nation's leading producer of hazard-
ous wastes.23 A report commissioned by former New Jersey
Governor Brendan T. Byrne reveals that as many as 10,000 produc-
ers of hazardous substances operate within the state.24 New Jersey
operational reports indicate that nearly 320,000 tons of waste were
illegally disposed of at generation sites within the state in 1979.5'
The unregulated disposal threatens the groundwater supplies which
provide half of the state's drinking water.26
This comment will demonstrate that post hoc environmental
laws offer inadequate protection against improper hazardous waste
disposal practices. In comparison, the ECRA approach to hazardous
waste regulation, though not perfect, provides a more effective and
efficient means of achieving the state's goal of minimizing the poten-
tial risks of hazardous substances.
The comment is primarily a discussion of New Jersey statutory
and common-law theories of environmental tort recovery. The law
and theory here analyzed, however, are applicable to other jurisdic-
tions. The discussion begins with a review of the traditional com-
mon-law approaches to environmental tort recovery and that of the
major pre-ECRA statutory law. The comment will also address the
problems with these approaches. The discussion then turns to the de-
veloping area of successor landowner liability through an analysis of
case law in that area. The comment concludes with an analysis of
ECRA itself and a discussion of its potential effects on environmen-
tal policy.
22. Analysis, supra note 14, at 118 n. 13 citing Solution May Be The Problem in Fight
Against Toxic Wastes, Newark Star-Ledger, Aug. 13, 1979, at 7, col. 2.
23. Analysis, supra note 14 at 118 n.13 citing Kamlet, Toxic Substances Programs in
U.S. States and Territories: How Well Do They Work?, 4 NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL SERIES IV (1979) (analyzes and critiques present federal and
state programs).
24. Analysis, supra note 14, at 118 n.13 citing REPORT OF GOVERNOR BRENDAN
BYRNE'S HAZARDOUS WASTE ADVISORY COMMISSION, 11 passim (1980) [hereinafter cited as
COMMISSION].
25. Analysis, supra note 14, at 119 citing COMMISSION supra note 24 at 12. The mar-
ket place provides little incentive for industry to develop proper hazardous waste disposal sys-
tems. Industries often turn to the least expensive methods of disposal even though they are
cognizant that some methods are potentially dangerous. Cohen & Derkics, Financial Respon-
sibility For Hazardous Waste Sites, 9 CAP. U.L. REV. 509, 510 (1980).
26. Analysis, supra note 14 at 121 citing COMMISSION supra note 24, at 5. Contamina-
tion of groundwater occurs through "leaching," which is defined as a process by which pollu-
tants migrate from the surface of the land or water where they are placed through the subsoil
and then into groundwater. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1282 (Una-
bridged ed. 1976); See also, State v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 254, 463 A.2d 893 (1983); New
Jersey Dep't of Transp. v. PSC Resources, 175 N.J. Super. 447, 419 A.2d 1151 (1980); State
v. Exxon, 151 N.J. Super. 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (1977); accord United States Price, 688 F.2d
204 (3d Cir. 1982); and National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth Dep't of Env't
Resources, 489 Pa. 221, 414 A.2d 37 (1980) appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 803 (1980).
II. Remedial Approaches to Environmental Regulation
A. Traditional Theories of Recovery
A person injured by the improper disposal of hazardous waste
can pursue several common-law theories of recovery. Negligence,
trespass, nuisance and strict liability are the general theories tradi-
tionally asserted in hazardous waste cases.
27
1. Negligence.--State and federal courts have long recognized
negligence actions against defendants who engage in the improper
disposal of pollutants such as hazardous waste.28 Negligence is de-
fined as the failure to exercise the degree of care a reasonable person
under the same circumstances would exercise in order to avoid injur-
ing others.29 The possessor of land is liable for reasonably foresee-
able injuries resulting from the use of a dangerous agency on his
land. 0 One court has articulated the standard as follows:
A landowner who maintains or permits the existence of some-
thing potentially dangerous to adjoining property . . . when he
undertakes to make artificial changes in the land as, for exam-
ple, by the storing or depositing of movable material on his land
which afterward is carried by the ordinary force of nature,
becomes liable for his negligence if any.
31
27. For a detailed discussion of these theories, see ANALYSIS, supra note 14. See gener-
ally Sakalow, Hazardous Waste Liability, 14 CONN. L. REV. 307 (1982) (succinct discussion
of the traditional common law theories of recovery).
28. J. ARBUCKLE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW. HANDBOOK 18 (7th ed. 1983) [hereinafter
cited as J. ARBUCKLE].
29. Reasonable care is the level of care that an ordinarily prudent person would exer-
cise under like circumstances. See Mclntosk v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500
(1979); Ginnelly v. Continental Paper Co., 57 N.J. Super. 506, 155 A.2d 154 (1959) ("fore-
seeability" does not mean that the precise hazard or the exact consequences which were en-
countered should have been foreseen); Schaublin v. Leber, 50 N.J. Super. 506, 142 A.2d 910
(App. Div. 1958).
The traditional formula for the elements necessary to such a cause of action may
be stated as follows: (1) A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring
the actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of
others against unreasonable risks; (2) A failure on his part to conform to the
standard required ... ; (3) A reasonably close causal connection between the
conduct and the resulting injury ... ; (4) Actual loss or damage resulting to
the interests of another . . . . The threat of future harm not yet realized is not
enough.
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER]. For a
dated but exhaustive discussion of negligence law in New Jersey, see STEVENSON, NEGLI-
GENCE LAW IN NEW JERSEY (1945).
30. See Knabe v. National Supply Div. Armco Steel, 592 F.2d 841, 843 (5th Cir.
1979) (discharge of oil and water mixture into creek was negligence); Black v. Public Serv.
Elec. & Gas Co., 56 N.J. 63, 77, 265 A.2d 129, 140 (1970) (reasonable care includes circum-
spection and foresight). See also Wytupeck v. City of Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 457, 136 A.2d
887, 892 (1958) (when using a dangerous instrumentality on land, common law raises a "pub-
lic duty" of care); Imre v. Riegel Paper Corp., 25 N.J. 450, 132 A.2d 505 (1951).
31. Ettl v. Land and Loan Co., 122 N.J.L. 401, 404, 5 A.2d 689, 691 (Sup. Ct. 1939)
(action for damage caused by sand blown on plaintiff's property from adjoining property of
State and federal environmental statutes aid those who seek to prove
their case against polluters. Violation of these statutes is evidence of
negligence under New Jersey law.32
2. Trespass.-Trespass is a physical interference with an-
other's possessory interest in land. 33 It is not necessary that the de-
fendant enter upon another's land. He need only cause or permit a
physical invasion of another's property.34 A trespass may be commit-
ted by discharging particle emissions onto,35 or allowing gas or oil to
flow underground into, another's land. Nonphysical invasions such as
the casting of light upon another's property 0 are generally classified
as nuisances. 37 Intent is not an element of the trespass action and
mistake or use of reasonable care is no defense.38 In many cases, an
abandoned or improperly operated waste dump may give rise to both
a trespass and a nuisance action. The trespass occurs when waste
seeps through the ground and leaches into the groundwater on plain-
tiff's property. The nuisance occurs when this contamination results
in an interference with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his
land. 9 Few cases have applied trespass concepts to environmental
law."' Perhaps this is because environmental litigation is frequently
commenced on behalf of the people by their government, which lacks
the kind of private possessory interest in the affected property
needed to sustain an action in trespass.
3. Nuisance.-Nuisances, which receive more play in environ-
mental tort litigation than any other common-law theory of liabil-
defendant).
32. See Shartz v. Tec Technical Adhesives, 174 N.J. Super. 135, 415 A.2d 1188 (App.
Div. 1980) (fact that adhesive manufacturer violated the Federal Hazardous Substances Act
was admissible evidence to prove negligence of manufacturer in suit brought by owners of a
house that caught fire).
33. REPORT, supra note 13, at 101 (trespass only protects possessory interests and,
therefore, does not protect mere ownership interests, such as that of the lessor).
34. See, e.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metal Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960) (vapor emitted from Reynold's plant, which deposited micro-
scopic fluoride compounds on Martin's property held to be a trespass).
35. See, e.g., Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979) (damage to
farmland caused by deposits from land emissions).
36. See, e.g., Boro v. Exxon Corp., 388 So. 2d 933 (Ala. 1980) (absent showing that
there was particulate matter deposited upon her property, plaintiff could not recover on theory
of trespass against defendant whose operation of a treating facility caused horrible odors and
light from flares to impinge upon plaintiff's property: prime candidate for nuisance action).
37. J. ARBUCKLE, supra note 28, at 17. See also infra notes 41-46 and accompanying
text.
38. W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 594; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 164-166
(1976) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
39. Martin v. Reynolds Meta Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959).
40. See generally Annot., 2 A.L.R. 4th 1054 (1980); ANALYSIS, supra note 14 at 125-
28; see generally VANNACONNE & COHEN, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (1972).
ity,4' are classified as either public or private. A public nuisance is a
substantial and unreasonable interference with a public right.4 A
private nuisance is an unreasonable interference with the use and
enjoyment of an interest in land.4 3 Generally, a person may use his
land or personal property as he sees fit, but he must do so in a rea-
sonable manner.44
Reasonability is determined by balancing the utility of the de-
fendant's conduct against the harm suffered by the plaintiff. Some
authorities have advanced the theory that injurious conduct lacks
utility if it is economically and technically feasible to correct it, but
corrective action is not taken.45
41. J. ARBUCKLE, supra note 28, at 9. "Nuisance" is defined as an "unreasonable, un-
warranted or unlawful use by a person of his own property, working obstruction or injury to
right of another, or to the public, and producing such material annoyance, inconvenience and
discomfort that law will presume resulting damage." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 552
(Abridged 5th ed. 1983); see also Comment, A Private Nuisance Approach to Hazardous
Waste Disposal Sites, 7 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 86 (excellent article thoroughly analyzing use of
the nuisance theory in toxic tort cases) [hereinafter cited as Hazardous Waste Disposal].
42. Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with a public right
is unreasonable include the following: (a) whether the conduct involves a significant interfer-
ence with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the
public convenience, (b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or adminis-
trative regulation, or (c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a
permanent or long lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a signifi-
cant effect upon the public right. RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, at § 821B.
43. RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, at § 821D.
44. See J. ARBUCKLE, supra note 28, at 9; Sans v. Ramsey Golf and Country Club
Inc., 29 N.J. 438, 448, 149 A.2d 599, 605 (1959). In Sans, litigation arose because plaintiffs
built their house adjacent to a golf course and golfers threatened and harassed plaintiff's chil-
dren. Golf balls were often hit into plaintiff's yard and over the heads of plaintiff's children
and their friends. On one occasion an incensed golfer used his four iron on the plaintiff's
barking dog to instill in the animal an appreciation for silence. The court noted that "[t]he
question is not simply whether a person is annoyed or disturbed, but whether the annoyance or
disturbance arises from an unreasonable use of the neighbor's land or operation of his busi-
ness." See also Folmar v. Elliot Coal Mining Co., 441 Pa. 592, 272 A.2d 910 (1971) (suit to
recover damages for injury to plaintiff's property allegedly caused by air pollution attributable
to defendant's operation of its coal cleaning plant); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26
N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970) (suit to enjoin cement factory from
continuing operations which emitted particles into the air which settled on and damaged cars
in plaintiff's new car lot); Majestic Realty Assoc., Inc. v. Tote Contracting Co., 30 N.J. 425,
153 A.2d 321 (1959) (whether dangerous construction operations constitute a nuisance or a
nuisance per se), Ackerman v. Ellis, 81 N.J.L. 1, 79 A. 883 (1911) (branches from defendant's
trees which overhung the premises of plaintiff's property were an actionable nuisance).
45. RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, at § 826:
An intentional invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of
land is unreasonable if (a) the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the
actor's conduct, or (b) the harm caused by the conduct is serious and the finan-
cial burden of compensating for this and for similar harm to others would not
make the continuation of the conduct not feasible.
Accord Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 226, 257 N.E.2d 870, 873, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312, 317 (1970) (if utility is great, then defendant will not be enjoined from contin-
uing the conduct unless defendant refuses to compensate plaintiff for damages); Madison v.
Ducktown Sulfur, Copper and Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904) (court refused to
protect plaintiff's property by grantir g an injunction against defendant because to do so would
have destroyed defendant's operations which were of great value to society). The theoretical
advantage of trespass over nuisance is that trespass does not require a balancing of the gravity
of the harm caused by defendant against the social utility of defendant's conduct. REPORT,
Abandoned and improperly operated waste operations are a fer-
tile source of both private and public nuisance actions. Industrial op-
erations involving hazardous substances, however, are often so bene-
ficial to society that they are not considered unreasonable.
Nevertheless, abandoned or improperly operated waste dumps can
hardly be said to benefit society. Indeed, they often unreasonably
interfere with public rights."'
4. Strict Liability.-The theory of strict liability is based on
the notion that certain activities, though legal and beneficial to the
community, are so abnormally dangerous that those who engage in
them are held unconditionally liable for resulting injuries, regardless
of fault.47 The doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activities originated in the early English decision of Rylands v.
Fletcher.48 In Rylands, an action was brought by a mine owner
whose mine was flooded by water when the defendant attempted to
fill a reservoir on an adjacent tract of land. The House of Lords
found that the defendant had put his "land to a non-natural use for
the purpose of introducing into it that which in its natural condition
was not in or upon it.""4' Thus, the defendant was strictly liable for
any injuries resulting from the unnatural use. The New Jersey Su-
preme Court recently concluded that toxic wastes are abnormally
dangerous and that disposal of them is an abnormally dangerous ac-
tivity. 50 Accordingly, persons involved in such activity may be
strictly liable for any resulting injury.
(a) Enterprise Liability Theory.-The modern doctrine of strict
liability is, in essence, synonymous with the theory of enterprise lia-
bility.5 1 This theory requires a defendant business operation to pay
for any damages resulting from its activities as a cost of doing busi-
supra note 13, at 103.
46. In State v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 463 A.2d 893 (1983), the court found
defendant owners of a discontinued mercury processing operation liable for a public nuisance
resulting from the leaching of mercury into groundwater used by the public. See also City of
Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 146 N.J. Super. 169, 369 A.2d 49 (1976) (defendant lessor of
property found strictly liable for public nuisance created by defendant spilling oil onto
ground).
47. W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 494.
48. 3 L.R.E. & 1. App. 330 (1868).
49. Id. at 338-39.
50. See Ventron, 94 N.J. at 493, 431 A.2d at 903. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note
38, at § 520 (provides a list of elements used in determining what is an abnormally dangerous
activity).
51. The theory of enterprise liability is founded upon three assumptions: first, that the
defendant is better able to insure against loss than the innocent plaintiff; second, that the
defendant can pass costs along to his customers; and third, that a more efficient resource allo-
cation is effectuated by placing the burden of liability on the party best able to take precau-
tionary measures. W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 571-612 and 492-540.
ness. Enterprise liability "emphasizes the availability of insurance to
the defendant and the defendant's ability to pass on the costs of lia-
bility to its customers in the form of higher prices. 52 The theory
assumes that the defendant is in a better position to know the
hazards of his operations or product than is the general public. The
defendant therefore, should be responsible for protecting the public
from those hazards.
New Jersey did not immediately accept the enterprise liability
doctrine.5 3 Instead, it developed a "nuisance per se" doctrine much
akin to enterprise liability. 4 Nuisance per se is premised on the in-
ability of the defendant to eliminate the risk of harm through rea-
sonable care. 5  An activity or structure which remains a nuisance
under all circumstances and at all times, regardless of surroundings,
is a nuisance per se. 5" The doctrine may be applicable to the use or
storage of hazardous substances because safe storage clearly remains
an unsolved dilemma.
(b) New Jersey adopts enterprise liability theory.-In the 1983
case of State v. Ventron Corp., the Supreme Court of New Jersey
expressly adopted the Rylands doctrine, recognizing that "those who
use, or permit others to use, land for the conduct of abnormally dan-
gerous activities are strictly liable for resultant damages." '57 Al-
though Ventron had important ramifications in New Jersey, the
court's express recognition of the Rylands doctrine by itself had little
effect on environmental protection law.58 After all, the concept of
negligence per se, the Rylands doctrine and the theory of enterprise
liability are minute variations of the same concept. They impose sim-
ilar liability.59
52. Analysis, supra note 14 at 129 (citing Bergman, No Fault Liability for Oil Pollu-
tion Damages, 5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 1, 30 (1973)).
53. The New Jersey Supreme Court expressly repudiated the doctrine in Marshall v.
Wilwood, 38 N.J.L. 339 (1876).
54. The doctrine of nuisance per se was first applied in McAndrews v. Collerd, 42
N.J.L. 189 (1880) (materials stored in a magazine exploded and damaged nearby property).
55. See Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEx. L. Rav. 399, 404 (1942).
56. See Scotch Plains Twp. v. Westfield, 83 N.J. Super. 323, 337, 199 A.2d 673, 680
(1964). See also Priory v. Borough of Monasquan, 39 N.J. Super. 147, 157, 120 A.2d 625,
630 (1956) (a nuisance per se incurs absolute liability). In Berg v. Reaction Motors Div.,
Thiokol Chem. Corp., 37 N.J. 396, 410, 181 A.2d 487, 494 (1962), the Supreme Court of
New Jersey took the position that an "ultrahazardous activity which introduces an unusual
danger into the community . . . should pay its own way in the event it actually causes damage
to others."
57. Ventron, 94 N.J. at 488, 463 A.2d at 900.
58. Previously, in 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that "this is the proper
time to extend strict liability in New Jersey to those who store ultrahazardous or pollutant
substances. This means that a defendant becomes liable for damages caused to a proper plain-
tiff." City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 146 N.J. Super. at 177, 369 A.2d at 53. Thus, the
court had essentially adopted the doctrine as early as 1976.
59. See Analysis, supra note 14, at 128-34; but see Hazardous Waste Disposal, supra
B. Problems of Common Law Remedies
Although the theories of recovery previously discussed exist to
aid victims of pollution, the theories are often beset with problems
that diminish their effectiveness.
1. Statute of Limitations.-Toxic tort plaintiffs may encoun-
ter statute of limitations problems.60 The latent nature of toxic tort
injuries frequently delays their discovery for many years,6' often be-
yond the period for bringing an action. New Jersey has adopted the
more equitable "discovery rule" for determining when the statutory
period begins to run: "The discovery rule 'provides that in an appro-
priate case a cause of action will be held not to accrue until the
injured party discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence
and intelligence should have discovered, that he may have a basis for
an actual claim.' "62 This equitable doctrine allows the victim of an
environmental tort to bring an action within a reasonable time after
the injury and its cause are discovered.6"
2. Causation Problems.-An essential element of any tort
claim "is that there be some reasonable connection between the act
or omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has
suffered." ' " Proof of causation is especially difficult for the toxic tort
note 41, at 107 (noting that although the Rylands concept and the strict liability concept may
overlap, they are different concepts). An excellent discussion of the differences and similarities
between these concepts is provided in Anderson, The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine in America:
Abnormally Dangerous, Ultrahazardous, or Absolute Nuisance?, 1978 ARIz. ST. L.J. 99.
60. The purpose of a statute of limitations is twofold: first, it encourages plaintiffs to
litigate their claims within a reasonable time so that the opposing party has a fair opportunity
to defend; second, it penalizes those who sit on their rights. See, e.g., Ochs v. Federal Ins. Co.,
90 N.J. 108, 447 A.2d 163 (1982) (plaintiff was injured in a motorcycle accident); Kruger v.
United States, 539 F.2d 317, 321 (3d Cir. 1976) (fraudulent conduct on the part of govern-
ment did not warrant tolling of statute of limitations for bringing tax refund claim until plain-
tiff discovered the fraud).
61. See REPORT, supra note 13, at 43; Analysis, supra note 14 at 145. See also
Karjola v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir. 1975) (statute begins
to run when asbestoses manifests itself in a way which supplies some evidence of causal
connection).
62. Analysis, supra note 14 at 146 (quoting Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 272, 300
A.2d 563, 565 (1973)).
The ignorance may be that [plaintiff] is unaware that he has sustained an injury
until after the statute of limitations has run, New Market Poultry Farms, Inc. v.
Fellow, 51 N.J. 419, 241 A.2d 633 (1968), or the Plaintiff might not know the
cause of the damage and that the damage is attributable to the fault or neglect
of another. Lopez v. Swyer (cite omitted).
REPORT, supra note 13, at Appendix 330.
63. Under this doctrine, a plaintiff ordinarily has two years subsequent to discovery to
bring an action. See Muran v. Nopolitano, 71 N.J. 133, 363 A.2d 346 (1976).
64. W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 236. Proximate cause is an efficient cause, setting
the other causes in motion which result in injury. Proximate cause is a substantial factor
though not the sole factor in bringing about a plaintiff's injury. Huddel v. Levin, 395 F. Supp.
64 (D.N.J. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
plaintiff. Difficulties include the latent nature of toxic tort injuries,
changes in the ownership of property sites and changes in the nature
of deposited wastes.
In a typical toxic tort action, the defendant negligently, reck-
lessly or intentionally spills or dumps hazardous substances onto the
ground. The defendant may be unaware that the materials could
cause future harm to an innocent plaintiff. After several years, the
waste has leached into the groundwater system and contaminated
the plaintiff's well. Months or even years later, the plaintiff becomes
aware of the contamination and seeks to recover from the defendant
under theories of negligence, nuisance, trespass and strict liability.
To discover the responsible party, the plaintiff must trace the
contamination back to its source.65 This will be difficult if other
sources of contaminants are nearby.66 Moreover, the very nature of
the deposited wastes might have changed. 67 Because of the lapse in
time, the plaintiff may have difficulty proving that the defendant
caused the injury. 68 The generator of the waste may have since
abandoned the property or transferred it to another party. The plain-
tiff must then choose the correct defendant.69 Even worse, in negli-
gence actions, the plaintiff must prove that the alleged injury was
foreseeable by the defendant.7 0 Clearly, a quagmire of causation dif-
ficulties exists for the toxic tort plaintiff who seeks to recover under
traditional common law theories.
3. The Apportionment of Damages.-The problem of appor-
tioning damages arises in an environmental tort action because "dif-
ferent disposers, different owners, and sequential exposures may have
65. In Commonwealth v. Barnes and Tucker Co., 12 Pa. Commw. 496, 509, 353 A.2d
471, 478 (1971), aff'd, 472 Pa. 115, 371 A.2d 461 (1977), the defendant argued that although
the pollution was discharged through defendant's mine shaft, the source of pollution lay else-
where. The court avoided the problem by stating that it was only concerned with the source of
discharge.
66. Although technology is improving, it is still difficult to determine the movement of
underground water supplies and, therefore, the source of pollution. "There is no consensus on
drilling methods, sampling frequency or protocol, standard quality assurance procedures, or
the number of wells needed to define problems." Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law Liability
for Toxic Torts: A Phanton Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 359 (1981); see generally U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, PUBLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS OF SPILLED HAZARDOUS
AND Toxic CHEMICALS AND PETROLEUM OILS (1979); Sleeter, Methods for Identifying the
Source of Spilled Oil, 2 HARV. ENV'T L. REV. 514 (1977).
67. Chemicals may react with other chemicals or minerals in the groundwater before
reaching the plaintiff. Post, Chemistry and the Law: A Review of Recent Developments, 2
HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 523, 524 (1977).
68. Plaintiff must "introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclu-
sion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor
in bringing about the result." W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 241.
69. For a discussion of successor liability see infra text accompanying notes 96-133.
70. The scope of defendant's duty in a negligence action, except as limited by certain
policy considerations, is coextensive with the reasonable foreseeability of the consequences of a
negligent act. See Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981).
in fact contributed to the result." 1 The harm may be single and
indivisible, so that there may be no factual basis for division of lia-
bility among defendants. The inability to divide liability creates
problems when a plaintiff sues the present nonpolluting owner of the
waste 72 site and the party to whom disposal was entrusted, as well as
the generator of the pollution. Particularly thorny equitable issues
arise concerning the present owner's potential liability and the gener-
ator's degree of responsibility once he entrusts waste disposal to
another.73
4. Litigation Costs.-The costs of any litigation are high, but
the costs of litigation to a private, toxic tort plaintiff may be prohibi-
tive. The private plaintiff must pay for the detailed scientific studies
necessary to determine responsibility for his injury. The technical
nature of causation in such cases requires a plaintiff to locate and
compensate experts in at least the fields of health, geology and hy-
drology. Although some costs may be recovered eventually if the
plaintiff is successful, the excessive costs undoubtedly deter much
private litigation.
C. Statutory Approaches Before ECRA
A myriad of state and federal statutes regulate the handling of
wastes and attempt to remedy environmental tort injuries. These
statutes supplement the traditional common law theories and are en-
forced by state and federal agencies.
1. New Jersey Statutory Law.-New Jersey, a leader in regu-
latory reform, has enacted over 200 environmentally-related statutes.
The Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act)" ' , the Solid
Waste Management Act (SWMA),75 and most recently the Environ-
mental Cleanup Responsibility Act7 '6 are three of the most signifi-
cant enactments.
The Spill Compensation and Control Act serves as the "center-
71. REPORT, supra note 13, at 53.
72. This was the case in Ventron when successive owners of a mercury plant dumped
mercury onto the ground and into a lagoon, causing contamination of the public water supply.
The Superior Court in that case found that since the injury to plaintiff could not be subdivided
and proportionally allocated among defendant tortfeasors, the total damages were assessible
against each of the tortfeasors whose wrong "was a substantial factor in proximately causing
injury or loss." State v. Ventron Corp., 182 N.J. Super, 217, 222, 440 A.2d 455, 461 (1981).
73. ECRA attempts to alleviate these problems by requiring industrial establishments
to clean up their properties prior to closing or transferring operations. See infra note 134 and
accompanying text.
74. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 (a)-(z) (West 1982 & Supp. 1984-85).
75. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IE-1-42 (West 1979 & Supp. 1984-85).
76. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-6-13 (West Supp. 1984-85). For a discussion of ECRA
see infra text accompanying notes 135-225.
piece" of New Jersey's hazardous waste cleanup program. The Act
prohibits discharge of petroleum and other hazardous substances,77
taxes certain transfers of these materials78 and provides for cleanup
and removal of spills.79 Most importantly, however, the Act estab-
lishes the New Jersey Compensation Spill Fund (Spill Fund), which
pays for all immediate cleanup and removal costs and for all direct
and indirect damages resulting from a spill.80 Thus, a private plain-
tiff can recover under the Act. The fund, in turn, is empowered to
recover its costs, on a theory of strict liability, from those individuals
or organizations who are in any way responsible for the spill.81 In
1980 alone, the fund contributed over 28 million dollars to the
cleanup of toxic contamination while providing funds for research
and monitoring projects.
82
The Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA) established a pro-
gram to coordinate the collection, disposal and use of all solid waste
in the state.83 The Act requires all parties engaging in the collection
or disposal of solid waste to register and obtain approval from the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP).84 In
addition, engineering designs of all disposal facilities must be sub-
mitted to the NJDEP for approval. Violators are subject to revoca-
tion85 or suspension of permits.86
2. Federal Statutes.-The federal government has responded
to the growing environmental awareness movement by enacting ex-
tensive environmental legislation. Two of the more significant stat-
utes are the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA) 87 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
77. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11(c). "This section does not apply to discharge of
hazardous substances pursuant to and in compliance with the conditions of a federal or state
permit."
78. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11(h).
79. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11(F).
80. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11(g).
81. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11(g)(c).
82. Lesniak, The Statutory Treatment of Wastes: A Legislator's Perspective, 7 SETON
HALL LEG. J. 35, 39 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Lesniak]. Senator Lesniak is also the author
of ECRA. In this article he discusses both the Spill Act and the Solid Waste Management
Act.
83. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IE-2.
84. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IE-5.
85. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-12.
86. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-9.
87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. 1984). See State ex rel. Brown v. George-
off, 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. Waste Industries, 556 F. Supp.
1301 (E.D.N.C. 1982); United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1982); United
States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982); United States v.
Solvents Recovery Scrv. of New England, 495 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980); United States
v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). 88
RCRA was the first major federal enactment to deal specifically
with the management of hazardous waste. It provides a "cradle to
grave" regulatory scheme and encourages states to implement their
own regulatory programs." An "imminent hazard" provision" em-
powers the EPA to bring suit to enjoin any party involved with the
handling of hazardous substances from continuing operations when
the activity presents a substantial and imminent danger to the
environment.
CERCLA essentially establishes the Hazardous Substance Re-
sponse Trust Fund ("Superfund") to remedy the effects of hazardous
substances released into the environment. 91 Superfund is financed by
taxing the chemical and petroleum industries92 and pays for the
cleanup of hazardous waste releases. The fund can seek reimburse-
ment for cleanup costs, under a strict liability theory, from those
parties who are in any way responsible for the release, including suc-
cessor land owners.93 Unlike the New Jersey Spill Act, Superfund
does not compensate private individuals for injuries caused by waste
releases. The Act also creates a "Post-Closure Liability Fund."94
This fund assumes the liability of owners or operators of waste facili-
ties who have complied with regulations promulgated under the
Solid Waste Disposal Act9" when operating and closing facilities.
III. Successor Liability
Environmental tort plaintiffs often encounter the problem of de-
termining whom to sue. This is manifested vividly in the developing
area of successor landowner liability,96 which concerns the scope of
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a); see infra note 111 and accompanying text; Eschwege, Imple-
mening the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act: Problems of the Present, Recommen-
dations for the Future, 9 CAP. U.L. REV. 467 (1980) (discussing various aspects of the Act);
Anderson, The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 633, 646
(same).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 9631. See also infra text accompanying notes 116-18; see Note, Pre-
Emptive Scope of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980: Necessity for Active State Role, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 635-58 (1982).
92. I.R.C. §§ 4611, 4681 (1982).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 9607. See infra notes 116-118 and accompanying text; United States v.
Northeastern Pharm. and Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (strict
liability standard does not apply retroactively to past non-negligent off-site generators and
transporters).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 9641.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 9607. The fund assumes liability five years subsequent to closure of the
facility provided that no health or safety violations occur during that period.
96. This comment adopts the definition of the term "successor landowner" as set forth
in Comment, Successor Landowner Liability for Environmental Torts: Robbing Peter to Pay
Paul, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 329, 332 n.10 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Successor Landowner]:
"[Tihe term 'successor landowner' refers to the purchaser of any land which poses a threat to
liability of a landowner who purchases property previously contami-
nated with hazardous waste. The prevailing approach requires more
than mere ownership before liability will be imposed.9 7 Liability for
a successor landowner is founded upon one or more of three general
theories: common law nuisance, statutory liability and corporate suc-
cessor liability.
A. Common Law Nuisance
A purchaser of property is generally expected to inspect the
property prior to transfer and to assume responsibility for the prop-
erty "as is," absent express agreement to the contrary.9 8 One excep-
tion to the rule occurs when the property, at the time of transfer, is
in a condition that exposes those outside of the premises to an unrea-
sonable risk of harm.99 In this instance, the purchaser is usually not
held responsible for injuries suffered by a third party unless the pur-
chaser knew or should have known of the condition and failed to
abate it within a reasonable time. 100 The purchaser is held liable
only for his own unreasonable conduct under the circumstances.'
Buried hazardous waste, however, is not readily subject to discovery
by reasonable inspection or normal use. Therefore, knowledge of a
concealed condition such as buried waste normally would not be at-
tributed to purchasers as a matter of law.
10 2
Nonetheless, the case law concerning purchaser liability in haz-
ardous waste litigation is inconsistent.0 3 Although liability in these
cases is often imposed by statute, the general tort principles consid-
ered are pertinent to a discussion of common law nuisance in haz-
the environment due to conditions created by hazardous waste." See generally Rodburg, Land
Ownership and Hazardous Waste Law, 104 N.J. LAWYER 12 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Rodburg]; Comment, Changes in the Ownership of Hazardous Waste Sites: Successor Liabil-
ity, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 691 (1984).
97. CECLA is a strict liability statute and expressly imposes liability upon "owners" of
a waste site. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982).
98. See W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 412.
99. Id. at 413.
100. id. at 415.
101. Id. at 414. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, §§ 373, 366, 839 (1976).
102. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, §§ 839A comment a, 366A comment a (1976).
103. Compare United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981) (successor land-
owner held liable because he failed to investigate and failed to take action to abate pollution
after becoming aware of it) with State v. Ventron, 182 N.J. Super. 210, 440 A.2d 455 (1981)
(successor held liable because it continued the same pollution-causing conduct as the seller);
National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth Dep't of Env't Resources, 489 Pa. 221, 414
A.2d 37 (1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 803 (1980) (successor will be held liable if has
knowledge of the pollution and takes some affirmative conduct to positively associate himself
with the condition) and New Jersey Dep't of Transp. v. PSC Resources Inc., 175 N.J. Super.
447, 419 A.2d 1152 (1980) (successor owner liable for pollution generated by seller if the
successor continues the same operations as the seller) and State v. Exxon, 151 N.J. Super.
464, 376 A.2d 1139 (1977) (successor not liable if he has committed no act in furtherance of
the pollution).
ardous waste litigation.
Many courts have held that, absent application of Superfund,
successor landowners can be held liable only if they have acted in a
way that contributes to the pollution. 104 One court, however, has
held that although the successor did not create or maintain the haz-
ardous condition, he could be held liable if he subsequently became
aware of the condition on his property and failed to eliminate it.
10 5
Other courts have taken a much different view, imposing liability
only when the successor takes some affirmative action in furtherance
of the hazardous condition. 10 6 The affirmative action required does
not rise to the level of intentional, reckless, or even negligent miscon-
duct. The action suffices if it is a positive association, beyond mere
ownership or occupancy, with the condition after its creation.
107 Still
another court has found that no liability can be imposed absent some
degree of fault. 08
104. See, e.g., National Wood, 489 Pa. 221, 414 A.2d 37.
105. In Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, real estate brokers purchased a lot previously used as
an illegal waste landfill. The brokers knew the land had been used as a landfill but were not
aware of the presence of hazardous waste on the site. The brokers later became aware of the
pollution-causing waste but took no action to abate it. The court found the brokers liable for
pollution emanating from the landfill because they failed to reasonably investigate the property
before purchasing it, and because they took no action after discovery to eliminate the condi-
tion. The court found that the successors were contributing to the waste problem "by virtue of
their studied indifference to the hazardous condition." Id. at 1073. This decision appears to be
in agreement with the Restatement of Torts position on this issue as reflected in Sections 366
and 839. See also supra note 102 and accompanying text. These sections state that knowledge
plus a reasonable time to act create liability. But see State v. Ventron Corp., 182 N.J. Super.
217, 237, 440 A.2d 455, 464 (court found that although the current owners of the contami-
nated property were experienced real estate brokers and had been alerted prior to purchase
that the industrial buildings on the site contained hazardous waste, they did not have a duty to
investigate for latent defects such as subsurface and surface hazardous waste).
106. In National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth Dep't of Env't Resources, 35
Pa. Commw. 443, 387 A.2d 142 (1978), the court stated that unless a successor owner takes
some affirmative action to associate himself with the hazardous condition he cannot be held
liable for contamination emanating from his property. The court then found the successor
liable because he (a) was aware of the illegal and hazardous practices of his predecessor,
including the spilling of oil onto the ground; (b) made some attempt to correct the condition
subsequent to purchase; and (c) demanded a reduction in the sales price of the property upon
recognizing the hazard. Upon appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the decision of
the lower court. The reasoning of the Supreme Court is not clear. Although it did not reject
the reasoning of the Commonwealth Court, it appeared to rely instead on a strict liability
theory based merely upon ownership. The Supreme Court noted that "the validity of police
power depends little upon the owner or occupier's responsibility for causing the condition
... " National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth Dep't of Env't Resources, 489 Pa.
221, 238, 414 A.2d 37, 45 (1979). The majority never expressly adopted a strict liability the-
ory however, and Justice Flaherty, in a concurring opinion, stated that the majority decision,
though unclear, did not advocate a strict liability theory. The court instead adopted the "af-
firmative action theory" articulated by the lower court. National Wood, 489 Pa. at 242, 414
A.2d at 47 (Flaherty, J., concurring). The affirmative action standard is more equitable than a
strict liability standard based solely on ownership. Still, the lack of clarity in the majority
opinion should cause concern among successor landowners.
107. National Wood, 35 Pa. Commw. 443, 307 A.2d 142.
108. In State v. Exxon Corp, 151 N.J. Super. 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (1977), the Superior
Court of New Jersey firmly rejected any notion of strict liability based upon ownership. In that
case, the successor innocently purchased property from Exxon. Exxon had frequently dis-
These inconsistent positions afford little judicial direction for fu-
ture litigation in this area. They are, however, consistent in their le-
niency toward successor owners of waste sites. In nearly every case,
the courts required more than mere knowledge and failure to act
before imposing liability.10 9
B. Statutory Liability
Several federal and state environmental statutes have provisions
that appear to implicate successor landowners. The degree of liabil-
ity of successor landowners under these statutes, however, is often
unclear. Courts therefore interpret the statutes in accordance with
their legislative histories and public policy, 110 which only adds to the
confusion.
1. RCRA.-Whether the "imminent hazard" provision of
RCRA111 imposes liability upon present owners of abandoned waste
sites is a subject of dispute among federal courts. The dispute raises
the question of whether the Act distinguishes between cases in which
a presealt harm is caused by past disposal practices and cases in
which a present harm is caused by ongoing disposal practices.
charged oil on the site years before. Because the successor innocently purchased the property
and took no action in furtherance of the condition, the court found the defendant not liable.
The court stressed that a party cannot be liable for a nuisance caused by another over which
he had no control unless the party is actively engaged in culpable conduct. Exxon, 151 N.J.
Super. at 472, 376 A.2d at 1349. Compare with Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (no action required
for liability) and National Woods, 35 Pa. Commw. 443, 387 A.2d 142 (conduct need not rise
to the level of fault).
109. The theory of strict liability is frequently applied in successor landowner litigation
but is seldom expressly recognized because it is imposed upon defendants under the guise of
nuisance. W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 512. "It is clear ... that unless a statute requires it,
strict liability will never be found unless the defendant is aware of the abnormally dangerous
condition or activity, and has voluntarily engaged in or permitted it." W. PROSSER, supra note
29, at 517. See generally Successor Landowner, supra note 96.
110. Although a myriad of these statutes exist, a complete discussion of those other than
the most important is beyond the scope of this comment. For a sampling, see New Jersey
Water Supply Management Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:IA-1-17 (West 1982); New Jersey
Safe Drinking Water Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:12A--1I (West 1982 & Supp. 1984-85);
New Jersey Water Pollution Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-I (West 1982). Federal
acts include the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601 to 2629 (1982) and the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 to 7642 (1982).
Ill. The imminent hazard provision states that
upon receipt of evidence that the handling, storage, treatment, transportation or
disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment, the Administrator may
bring suit on behalf of the United States in the appropriate district court to
immediately restrain any person contributing to such handling . . . to stop . ..
or to take such other action as may be necessary . . . . The Administrator may
also, . . . take other action under this section including, but not limited to, issu-
ing such orders as may be necessary to protect public health and the
environment.
42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1982).
In United States v. Price,'12 the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey found the present owner of an inactive
landfill liable under RCRA section 6973(a) for contamination of
groundwater caused by the leaching of waste from the landfill. The
court noted that Congress intended a broad construction of RCRA.
Thus, it found that the Act applies to events which took place some
time in the past but still constitute a present and future threat of
harm. 113 The court held the successor landowner liable not because
he actively contributed to the pollution, but because he became
aware of the problem and failed to eliminate it.
The United States District Court for the District of North Car-
olina adamantly rejected the Price court's interpretation of RCRA
Section 6973(a). In State v. Waste Industries,"4 it noted that the
Section is an emergency provision and was not intended to encom-
pass chronic or abandoned dump sites. After careful analysis of the
statute and its legislative history, the court determined that Section
6973(a) was meant to apply to active human conduct only. Thus, it
can only be used against current landowners who are actively pollut-
ing.115 This split of opinion has yet to be resolved.
2. Superfund.-Congress recognized the inadequacies of
RCRA and responded by creating Superfund."16 CERCLA was
designed "to respond to releases of hazardous waste from inactive,
hazardous waste sites [by establishing] prohibitions and require-
ments concerning inactive waste sites and providing for the cleanup
of releases of hazardous waste at such sites. ' ' 1 7 The Act requires
that present owners of the hazardous waste site reimburse the fund
for the costs of cleanup.118 Though the Act purports to hold the pre-
112. 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.C.N.J. 1981), affid 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982); see supra
note 105.
113. Id. at 1071. See also supra note 87.
114. 556 F. Supp. 1301, 1318 (D.N.C. 1982).
115. See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 837
(W.D. Mo. 1984) (noting that Price court has given the broadest scope to RCRA). But see
United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1105 (D. Minn. 1982) (found
that section 7003 does apply to past acts which created the threat of harm); United States v.
Solvents Recovery Serv. of New England, 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (D. Conn. 1980) (found
that section 7003, the predecessor to section 6973(a), focuses on the prevention and ameliora-'
tion of hazardous conditions rather than on human activity). See generally Zaelke, Reflections
on Applying RCRA §f 7003 to Inactive Hazardous Waste Sites, 13 ENVTL. L.R. 10107 (1983)
(RCRA should apply to inactive sites); Reed, RCRA's Imminent Hazard Provision and Inac-
tive Hazardous Waste Dumps: A Reappraisal After United States v. Waste Industries, 13
ENVT'L L.R. 10074 (1983) (same).
116. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 to 9657 (1982). For a congressional discussion of the inadequa-
cies of RCRA, see H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6119, 6125.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1). Cf. Ventron, 94 N.J. 254, 463 A.2d 893 (1983).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). See also RODBURG, supra note 96, at 14 (discussing liability
under Superfund); Bleicher & Stonelake, Caveat Emptor: The Impact of Superfund and Re-
sent owner strictly liable, several defenses are available. If the owner
can show that he exercised due care in light of relevant circum-
stances and took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of
third parties, he is released from liability as long as he can also show
that the condition was caused by an act of God, or war, or by an act
or omission of a third party not subject to the owner's control. Thus,
Superfund appears to create a quasi-negligence standard for succes-
sor landowners who have not actively contributed to the hazardous
condition. Unlike an ordinary negligence action, however, the party
against whom the action is brought has the burden of proving that
he acted reasonably.
3. The New Jersey Spill Act.-The New Jersey Spill Com-
pensation and Control Act deems "any person who has discharged a
hazardous substance" or who is "in any way responsible for any haz-
ardous substance"" 9 strictly liable for all cleanup and removal costs
incurred by the NJDEP. This statute has been interpreted as a codi-
fication of common law nuisance.'2 ° Liability under it is quite broad,
although the minimum activity necessary to incur liability has not
been clearly articulated by the courts. It appears, however, that a
successor landowner is not liable if he does not engage in polluting
activity and does not cause or aggravate the existing condition.' 2 '
Defenses to strict liability provided in the Act include acts of God,
war and sabotage.' 22 Thus, it seems that, absent some culpable activ-
ity, a current landowner will not be held liable for the intentional
polluting activity of a third party.
C. Corporate Successor Liability
When the present landowner of a waste site is a corporation,
environmental tort plaintiffs have several additional theories under
which they may recover. The concept of corporate successor liability
lated Laws on Real Estate Transactions, 14 ENVTL. L.R, 10017 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Bleicher & Stonelakel.
119. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11g(c).
120. The act can be applied retroactively because it is simply a codification of an ex-
isting cause of action. See New Jersey Dep't of Trans. v. PSC Resources Inc., 175 N.J. Super.
447, 465, 419 A.2d 1152, 1161 (1980).
121. See Exxon, 151 N.J. Super. at 478, 376 A.2d at 1347. In Exxon, the court used
the Spill Act merely as a guide for construing a different act. It found nonetheless that the
language of the Spill Act evidences a legislative intent to affix liability only when a causal
nexus exists between an act of the successor landowner and the pollution. In Ventron, 94 N.J.
at 502, 463 A.2d at 908, the court, interpreting the Spill Act, noted that "[tlhe subsequent
acquisition of land on which hazardous substances have been dumped may be insufficient to
hold the owner responsible. Ownership or control over the property at the time of discharge,
however, will suffice."
122. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11(g)(d) (these defenses may be raised only by any
owner or operator of a major facility or vessel responsible for a hazardous waste discharge).
can be conceptually divided into two theories: the "structure of ac-
quisition" theory and the "continuing operations" theory.
1. Structure of Acquisition Theory.-The more traditional
"structure of acquisition" theory imposes liability upon a successor
corporation according to the structure of the corporate acquisition.
Generally, corporate mergers and corporate acquisitions through
purchase of outstanding stock do not absolve the merged entity of its
debts and liabilities. These debts and liabilities are transferred to the
corporate successor. On the other hand, when one entity purchases
the assets of another entity, it traditionally does not assume that en-
tity's liabilities. Nonetheless, a successor corporation will be liable
for the prior corporation's obligations if any of the following five con-
ditions are met: (1) the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to
assume debts and liabilities; (2) the transfer amounts to a consolida-
tion or merger; (3) the purchasing entity is merely a continuance of
the setting entity; (4) the transaction is entered into fraudulently; or
(5) there is inadequate consideration for the transfer or sale.123 The
traditional theory was primarily developed to protect creditors and
the rights of minority shareholders. 124 It is not a useful approach for
environmental tort litigation because it too often yields inconsistent
results.125 Additionally, liability based solely upon the structure of an
acquisition seems contrary to traditional notions of tort liability.
2. Continuing Operations Theory.-The more modern "con-
tinuing operations" theory, developed for use in products liability lit-
igation, is applicable to environmental torts when the successor cor-
poration "acquires all or substantially all of the predecessor
corporation for cash and continues essentially the same manufactur-
ing operation as the predecessor corporation. 1 26 In New Jersey
Dep't of Transp. v. PSC Resources, 27 the Superior Court of New
Jersey applied this theory to a situation in which the successor land-
owner purchased stock and assets of a waste oil facility and contin-
ued operating the facility. Both the seller and successor landowner
123. See Ramirez v. Amstead Industries, Inc., 171 N.J. Super. 261, 408 A.2d 818 (App.
Div. 1979), affid, 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981) (the court found this approach inappro-
priate in the context of a products liability action and adopted the modern approach).
124. See PSC Resources, 175 N.J. Super. at 458, 419 A.2d at 1156 (citing Comment,
61 MARQ. UNIV. L. REV. 595, 598 (1978) and Note, Products Liability-Corporations-Asset
Sales and Successor Liability, 44 TENN. L. REV. 905, 908 (1977)).
125. See Ramirez, 171 N.J. Super. 261, 408 A.2d 818; Turner v. Bituminous Cas Co.,
397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555,
264 A.2d 98 (1970), affd on other grounds, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div.
1972).
126. New Jersey Dep't of Transp. v. P.S.C. Resources, 175 N.J. Super. 447, 467, 419
A.2d 1152, 1162 (1980) (citing Ramirez, 171 N.J. Super. at 278, 408 A.2d at 827).
127. Id.
discharged oil on the ground resulting in contamination of ground-
water. The court concluded that the theory of enterprise liability is
applicable to environmental torts as well as to products liability.128
The corporate successor is in a better position to bear the costs of
injuries caused by materials produced by and utilized in its opera-
tions.129 These costs can be passed along to the successor's customers
and the successor can obtain insurance. Moreover, the corporate suc-
cessor is better informed about the health and safety risks of hazard-
ous materials than is the public. 30
Liability may also be imposed on a successor landowner by
"piercing the corporate veil." The court may choose to pierce the veil
if the subsidiary is a mere instrumentality of the parent corporation.
Liability is usually imposed, however, only when the parent corpora-
tion has abused the relationship by using the subsidiary for purposes
of fraud or injustice. 131
Several problems mar the desirability of applying successor
landowner liability to relatively unculpable landowners. First, the ap-
portionment of damages among defendants with varying degrees of
culpability is difficult, if not impossible. Second, the increasing num-
ber of environmental strict liability statutes have caused an increase
in litigation. Third, plaintiffs often bring actions against current
landowners only because the actual generator is either gone or insol-
vent. Thus, the landowner may have difficulty recovering from other
defendants.3" Fourth, successor liability may threaten third parties
128. Id. at 467, 419 A.2d at 1163. This theory is only applicable to strict liability envi-
ronmental torts. Id. at 462, 419 A.2d at 1157.
129. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977) (a
leading case in development of corporate successor products liability). See generally Comment,
Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A Corporate and Commercial Prospective, 11
HOFSTRA L. REV. 249-72 (1983).
130. See Ventron, 94 N.J. 254, 463 A.2d 893 (successor landowner company found lia-
ble for abatement of pollution caused both by it and the seller because the successor carried on
the operations of the seller); National Woods, 35 Pa. Commw. 443, 387 A.2d 142 (successor
who continued the operations of the seller was held liable for pollution caused both by it and
the seller).
131. See Mueller v. Seaboard Commercial Corp., 5 N.J. 28, 34, 73 A.2d 905 (1950).
Corporate veil-piercing can be used to impose liability upon a parent corporation that
purchases the property of its subsidiary. The New Jersey Superior Court applied this approach
to the parent corporation of a successor landowner in Ventron, 182 N.J. Super. 210, 410 A.2d
455. It found that the parent corporation had knowledge of the illegal dumping engaged in by
its subsidiary and that the parent was involved in the day to day operations of the subsidiary.
Thus, it found ample reason to pierce the corporate veil. This decision was reversed by the
New Jersey Supreme Court. The Supreme Court thought that the parent had not abused its
relationship with the subsidiary. See Ventron, 94 N.J. at 493, 463 A.2d at 903. Nonetheless,
these cases indicate a judicial willingness to pierce the corporate veil when the general public
welfare is at stake.
132. See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843-44 (W.D.
Mo. 1984) (EPA joined the successor landowner in an environmental suit only to insure that
corrections be implemented). One court has noted that a current owner's duty is primary be-
cause he has control over the hazardous waste, the potential instrument of injury. See Hut v.
Antonio, 95 N.J. Super. 62, 229 A.2d 823 (1967). See Bleicher & Stonelake, supra note 118,
as well. Mortgagees, for example, could be held liable as successor
landowners should they foreclose on a hazardous waste site.133 This
potential liability could in turn cool the willingness of financiers to
lend money for the purchase of property by industrial developers.
Ultimately, this could precipitate a decrease in the transferability of
property and hinder the public policy objective of maximizing the
use of resources.
The sale of contaminated property to unsuspecting buyers is
detrimental to both the individual buyer and the public. A new ap-
proach is needed to safeguard the environment, protect innocent pur-
chasers of property, and encourage the maximum utilization of re-
sources. The Environment Cleanup Responsibility Act is an
innovative piece of legislation that satisfies this need.
IV. The Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA)
A. How It Works
Unlike post hoc environmental statutes, ECRA adopts a pre-
ventative approach to environmental protection. It requires owners or
operators of environmental establishments using hazardous sub-
stances to clean up their property as a precondition to closure, termi-
nation or transfer of operations.
Application of the Act is limited to "industrial establish-
ments."' 34 Generally, an "industrial establishment" is a business
at 10021-10024.
133. In a recent Delaware case, a bank foreclosed on industrial property littered with
hazardous waste and was forced by environmental authorities to clean up the property. The
bank was later sued when the contracted transporter dumped the waste illegally. See Bank of
Delaware v. Allstate Insurance Co., Civ. Action No. 81C-OC- 118 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1982). This
case is briefly discussed along with other associated problems of successor landowner liability
in Bleicher & Stonelake, supra note 118.
134. The Act defines "industrial establishment" as
any place of business engaged in operations which involve the generation, manu-
facture, refining, transportation, treatment, storage, handling, or disposal of haz-
ardous substances or wastes on-site, above or below ground, having a Standard
Industrial Classification number within 22-39 inclusive, 46-49 inclusive, 51 or 76
as designated in the Standard Industrial Classifications Manual prepared by the
Office of Management and Budget in the Executive Office of the President of the
United States. Those facilities or parts of facilities subject to operational closure
and post-closure maintenance requirements pursuant to the 'Solid Waste Man-
agement Act,' P.L. 1970, C. 39 (C. 13:IE-49 et seq.) the 'Major Hazardous
Waste Facilities Siting Act,' P.L. 1970 C.39 (C. 13:IE-! et seq.), or the 'Solid
Waste Disposal Act,' (42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.), or any establishment engaged
in the production or distribution of agricultural commodities, shall not be consid-
ered industrial establishments for the purposes of this act.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-8(F).
The original version of ECRA, introduced to the New Jersey General Assembly in 1982,
defined "Industrial Establishment" differently than the enacted statute. It did not require that
business operations both (a) handle hazardous substances and (b) fall within the designated
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) numbers. Instead, either factor alone could qualify a
business as an industrial establishment. The original definition would have yielded ludicrous
which engages in the on-site handling of hazardous substances and
which has any one of the several Standard Industrial Classification
numbers designated in the Act.135 ECRA is activated by the closing,
termination or transfer of operations, 136 not by the discovery of pol-
lution, as in other legislation. Events included within the statutory
definition of "closing, termination or transfer of operations" include:
(a) cessation of all operations involving hazardous waste, (b) tempo-
rary cessation of such operations for not less than two years, (c) sale
of the stock resulting in a statutory merger or consolidation, (d) sale
of the controlling share of the business assets, (e) transfer of the real
property upon which hazardous substances are located, (f) dissolu-
tion of the business, (g) financial reorganization of the business, (h)
initiation of bankruptcy proceedings either against the business or by
the business, or (i) any other transaction or proceeding whereby the
business becomes nonoperational for health and safety reasons or
whereby the business undergoes a change in ownership. Thus, even
though the hazardous substances do not present an imminent danger
to the public health or safety, the Act may still require cleanup.
The owner or operator of an "industrial establishment" prepar-
ing to close or terminate operations must notify the NJDEP no later
than five days after it publicly announces its decision to close. 1
7
results. The designated SIC numbers include such business operations as travel agencies and
radio broadcasting stations. Thus, these safe businesses would have been forced to comply with
the Act under the original definition. The legislature properly revised the definition. For a list
of other business operations within the designated code numbers, see infra note 135. ECRA's
interim regulations state that for purposes of the Act, an industrial establishment which closed
operations prior to enactment of ECRA, but which continues to store hazardous substances on
the site, is considered to be an ongoing business operation engaged in the storage of waste and,
therefore, subject to ECRA. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § l-3.4(a)(l)(ii)(l) (1984).
135. Operations designated under the Standard Industrial Classification system include
textile mill products, apparel, lumber and wood products, furniture and fixtures, paper and
allied properties, chemicals and allied products, printing and publishing industries, petroleum
refining and related industries, rubber and miscellaneous plastics products, leather products,
stone products, clay products, glass products, concrete products, primary metal industries,
fabricated metal products, machinery, electrical and electronic machinery, transportation
equipment, measure analyzing and controlling instruments, photographic medical and optical
goods, miscellaneous manufacturing industries, pipelines, transportation services, communica-
tions, utilities, nondurable goods wholesaling and miscellaneous repair services. NEW JERSEY
DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, BUREAU OF INDUSTRIAL SITE EVALUATION CN-028,
A GUIDE To THE ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP RESPONSIBILITY ACT "ECRA" 2 (1984) [here-
inafter cited as ECRA GUIDE]. To comply with ECRA, Texaco, Inc., recently transferred
5,000 tons of sludge from its Eagle Point refinery near Westville, New Jersey, to its Delaware
city plant. Texaco is selling the Eagle Point facility. 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1479 (1985).
136. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-8(b). See also the "Interim Environmental Cleanup
Responsibility Act Regulations" promulgated at N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 1-3.18 (1984).
Recently, the New Jersey legislature enacted legislation requiring that owners or operators of
"industrial establishments," or of real property that was once the site of an "industrial estab-
lishment," report to the NJDEP within days of learning of an on-site hazardous discharge. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-15-18 (West Supp. 1985). The Act includes a liability provision, but,
significantly, does not impose liability for cleanup upon the owner or operator. It does not,
however, preclude a finding of liability under other applicable laws.
137. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-9a(l). The initial notice requirement is actually quite
Upon closing operations, or within sixty days after closing, which-
ever is later, the owner or operator must submit to the NJDEP for
approval either a written "negative declaration" that the operations
site is free from any hazardous substances, 138 or a cleanup plan 39
describing in detail the location of the hazardous material as well as
a recommendation for and cost estimate of cleanup procedures. If a
cleanup plan is necessary, the Act requires the owner or operator to
guarantee performance of the plan by obtaining a surety bond or
other financial security to be approved by the NJDEP. 40
An owner or operator of an industrial establishment planning to
sell or otherwise transfer operations involving the handling of haz-
ardous materials must notify the NJDEP in writing within five days
of the execution of a sale agreement or purchase option."" Either a
negative declaration must be submitted to the NJDEP for approval
or a cleanup plan must be attached to the transfer agreement within
sixty days prior to the transfer of title."" A surety bond or other
financial security must be obtained and approved by the NJDEP. 43
If the transferee plans to continue substantially the same operation,
the cleanup plan may be deferred, upon written certification to and
approval by the NJDEP. 44 The deferral will continue until either
complex and has been criticized by industry spokespersons. The quantity and types of informa-
tion required under the initial notice provision make it nearly impossible to comply with the
five day deadline. The NJDEP responded to numerous objections by dividing the required
information into two parts and making separate reporting forms for each part. The General
Information Submission form (GIS) consists of readily available information and must be sent
to the NJDEP within five days subsequent to the industrial establishment's public announce-
ment of its decision to close. The Site Evaluation Submission is essentially an environmental
evaluation and must be submitted to the NJDEP within thirty days following public announce-
ment of the Department's decision. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 1-3.7(d).
138. The Act defines "Negative Declaration" as
a written declaration, submitted by an industrial establishment and approved by
the department, that there has been no discharge of hazardous substances or
wastes on the site, or that any such discharge has been cleaned up in accordance
with procedures approved by the department, and there remain no hazardous
substances or wastes at the site of the industrial establishment.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-8(g).
139. The Act defines "Cleanup Plan" as
a plan for the cleanup of industrial establishments, approved by the department,
which may include a description of the locations, types and quantities of hazard-
ous substances and wastes that will remain on the premises; a description of the
types and locations of storage vessels, surface impoundments, or secured landfills
containing hazardous substances and wastes; recommendations regarding the
most practicable method of cleanup; and a cost estimate of the cleanup plan.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-8(a).
140. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-9(a)(2).
141. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-9(b)(l).
142. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-9(b)(2).
143. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-9(a)(2).
144. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-9(c) and 13:lK-lI(b). A deferral is subject to approval
by the NJDEP. Regulations promulgated under ECRA provide that the NJDEP will approve
a deferral only upon a finding that the deferral "poses no threat of potential harm to the public
health and safety of the citizens, property and natural resources of New Jersey." N.J. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 7, § 1-3.14(3). The policy behind ECRA is to provide for an orderly and safe dispo-
the use of the property changes or the transferee closes or transfers
the operation.
An owner cannot, however, escape the cleanup obligation. The
Act states that obligations imposed do not constitute a lien or claim,
but, instead, constitute continuing regulatory obligations that are not
dischargeable even in bankruptcy.145
ECRA provides several mechanisms for enforcement of its pro-
visions. First, any transfer subject to the provisions of the Act is
voidable by the transferee if the transferor fails to comply with any
provisions of the Act."4 6 Second, noncompliance by the transferor en-
titles the transferee to recover damages from the transferor."
Third, failure to comply with the Act renders the transferor strictly
liable for all cleanup and removal costs and for all direct and indi-
rect damages resulting from failure to implement the plan.148
Fourth, failure to submit either a cleanup plan or a declaration gives
the NJDEP authority to void the transfer.14 9 In addition to these
enforcement mechanisms, persons who knowingly give false informa-
tion, or cause false information to be given, or who fail to comply
with the Act, are personally liable for a penalty not to exceed
$25,000 for each offense. 5 ' A separate penalty is incurred for every
day the violation continues. Significantly, compliance with the Act
does not preclude the NJDEP from requiring cleanup according to
other laws or regulations. 15
B. The Evolution of ECRA
Passage of ECRA produced very little legislative history. There-
fore, a comparison of the bill as originally introduced with the en-
acted version of ECRA may be illustrative of legislative intent. Two
points of comparison are particularly revealing.
The first point involves the time constraints for submitting the
initial notification and cleanup plan. These were much more burden-
some to business in the original version of the bill. The original draft
required an industrial establishment to "notify the department in
writing no less than 180 days prior to closure or transfer of opera-
tions [and to submit] a cleanup plan, no later than 90 days prior to
sal of hazardous materials by those responsible for them. This indicates that deferment will
rarely be approved.
145. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-12. This provision has been challenged in a federal court
on a theory of federal preemption. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
146. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:lK-13(a).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-13(b).
150. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-13(c). Officers and management officials may be held
personally liable for all penalties for intentional violations of the Act. Id.
151. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-II(c).
closing or transferring operations.' 52 In contrast, the enacted ver-
sion requires notification within five days subsequent to public dis-
closure of an industrial establishment's intent to close, or execution
of a sale or purchase option agreement. 53 A cleanup plan must be
submitted upon the closing of operations, or within sixty days subse-
quent to closure. The less burdensome time constraints of the en-
acted bill evidence an intent on the part of the legislature to mini-
mize regulatory restraints that hamper management's ability to
make quick and opportune decisions in a volatile economic and polit-
ical climate.
Another key difference between the first draft and the enacted
version of the bill lies in the legal rights afforded to the transferee.
The original bill empowered the NJDEP to void the sale or transfer
of operations in the event of noncompliance with any provision of the
Act on the part of the transferor. 5 The transferee could recover for
damages resulting from the voided sale. The enacted version of the
bill, on the other hand, empowers the transferee himself to void the
sale or transfer upon a showing that the transferor failed to comply
with any provision of the Act.' 5 The NJDEP has power to void a
transfer only when the transferor fails to submit a cleanup plan or
negative declaration. The enacted version broadens the power of the
transferee and diminishes the power of the NJDEP. This change in-
dicates a legislative intent to afford greater protection to the unwit-
ting transferee from the problems associated with successor land-
owner liability.
But the power given to the transferee is subject to abuse. Theo-
retically, a transferee who becomes disenchanted with his purchase
could void the sale based upon some insignificant and unintentional
violation of ECRA by the transferor. In order to avoid inequitable
results, the legislature should consider limiting the transferee's power
to void transfers. Unintentional infractions which do not involve a
health or safety risk to the transferee or the community at large
should not provide grounds for voiding a sale. The transferee's power
to void should be limited solely to those instances when a transferor
fails to disclose to the transferee or NJDEP the existence of hazard-
ous substances on the transferred property. A change along these
lines would satisfy the intent of the legislature, while reducing possi-
ble abuses.
152. State of New Jersey Assembly, No. 1231, 4(a) introduced by Assemblyman Les-
niak (1982).
153. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-9.
154. State of New Jersey Assembly, No. 1231, 9(a).
155. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-13(a).
C. Regulations Promulgated Under ECRA: Problems and Issues
The Interim Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act Regula-
tions were published on March 5, 1984."'8 Like the Act, ECRA's
interim regulations have been the subject of much criticism, some of
which warrants discussion.
New Jersey industry' 57 has criticized the NJDEP for failing to
develop promptly the minimum standards for soil and water quality
required by ECRA. 158 Such standards, it is claimed, are crucial to
the development of effective cleanup programs and necessary to en-
able the evaluation of transferors' negative declarations. This prob-
lem is not unique to ECRA. 59 The complexity of environmental reg-
ulations often results in long delays between enactment of
environmental statutes and publication of standards for their en-
forcement. The NJDEP has stated that development of these stan-
dards will be a long-term project. Until standards can be developed,
the NJDEP will evaluate negative declarations and proposed cleanup
plans on an ad hoc basis. 60 Realistically, it may be impracticable to
develop one set "of standards upon which every industrial establish-
ment can rely for guidance. The purity of groundwater and soil de-
pends upon surrounding conditions. What may be an acceptable level
of water quality in one location may not be in another. Water qual-
ity in a heavily industrialized area is almost certain to be poorer
than in a nonindustrialized area. Minimum standards applicable to
nonindustrialized areas should not be lowered to match the poorer
quality water of industrialized areas. Conversely, water quality stan-
dards determined from nonindustrialized areas should not be im-
posed upon operators in industrialized areas because they would
probably be unattainable. Thus, the best approach would be to deter-
mine acceptable levels on a case-by-case basis.
In addition, industry spokesmen have expressed concern that the
exhaustive disclosure of information and the preliminary inspection
required under ECRA regulations 161 pursuant to ECRA's initial no-
tice provision may jeopardize trade secrets." 2 Certain information,
when placed in a public record, could be damaging to those in highly
156. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 1-3 (1984).
157. See, e.g., 16 N.J. Admin. Reg. 523-24 No. 9 (1984) (summary of public responses
to NJDEP interim regulations).
158. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:lK-10(a).
159. RCRA, a piece of federal legislation enacted in 1976, required states to implement
and establish laws in accordance with minimum federal standards to be promulgated under the
Act. By 1979, however, these standards were still not published. See Eschwege, Implementing
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act: Problems of the Present, Recommendations
for the Future, 9 CAP. U.L. REv. 467 (1980).
160. See 16 N.J. Admin. Reg. 523-24, No. 9.
161. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 1-3.7.
162. 16 N.J. Admin. Reg. 524, No. 7.
competitive industries. One industry organization has suggested that
the NJDEP should be required to demonstrate the need for confiden-
tial information and to insure that information a company wishes to
remain confidential will not be divulged in public records. 163 The
NJDEP has acknowledged this problem and plans to review requests
for confidentiality on an individual basis. 64
One commentator has labeled ECRA a "chemical plant hostage
bill." I65 He questions the authority of the NJDEP to require a pre-
liminary inspection subsequent to the issuance of the initial notice
mandated in the interim regulations, 6 6 contending that only a final
inspection to certify adequate cleanup is authorized by the Act. This
criticism appears unfounded. The Act expressly empowers the
NJDEP to "adopt rules and regulations establishing: . . . criteria
necessary for the evaluation and approval of cleanup plans . . . and
any other provisions or procedures necessary to implement [the]
act.' 16 7 The initial inspection clearly falls within this catch-all provi-
sion. The need for an inspection to determine the adequacy of a pro-
posed cleanup plan or negative declaration is clear. Indeed, an initial
inspection may prove beneficial to the industrial establishment. Ap-
proval of a negative declaration or cleanup plan is based upon infor-
mation provided to the NJDEP by the industrial establishment as
well as other existing information. Even after NJDEP has approved
a cleanup plan or declaration, it is not precluded from imposing
other requirements on or taking other remedial actions against the
industrial establishment. 6 " It would therefore seem to be in the best
interest of the industrial establishment to allow the NJDEP to in-
spect the site prior to approval of a plan or declaration so that any
undiscovered problems can be addressed in the plan or declaration.
From an economic standpoint, an operator certainly would want to
address all problems in one cleanup plan rather than implement sub-
sequent cleanup programs at the behest of the NJDEP because the
original plan is adjudged insufficient.
D. Clarification of Certain Provisions
ECRA is a new statute, and little explanatory literature is avail-
able other than that distributed by the NJDEP. It is important,
163. Letter from the Chemical Industry Council of New Jersey to Mr. Joseph Schmidt,
Jr., Esquire, of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (February 14, 1984)
(discussion of the interim ECRA regulations).
164. 16 N.J. Admin. Reg. 524, No. 7.
165. Hal Bozarth is counsel for the Chemical Industry Council of New Jersey and is
quite outspoken in his opposition to ECRA. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
166. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 1-3.8.
167. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-10(a).
168. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-II(c).
therefore, that the Act and all official commentary be carefully scru-
tinized. A close review reveals at least two official interpretations of
the Act that appear unfounded and may cause confusion.
The NJDEP, in its booklet entitled A Guide to the Environmen-
tal Cleanup Responsibility Act, states that "the owner or operator of
a firm, or the land on which it is situated, is required" to comply
with the notice and cleanup provisions of ECRA.169 This suggests
that if land is leased by an industrial establishment, the lessor must
comply with ECRA. Such an interpretation does not appear to be
supported by ECRA's provisions. Nowhere in the Act is any obliga-
tion imposed upon a landowner unless, of course, he is also the owner
or operator of the industrial establishment."' 0 A lessor is not respon-
sible under ECRA for cleanup of hazardous substances utilized in a
lessee's operations. The Act applies only to "[t]he owner or operator
of an industrial establishment" planning to close or transfer opera-
tions. Nevertheless, a lessor, as landowner of the site, could be held
liable under a nuisance theory, or possibly under some other common
law theory, for any harm caused to third parties by onsite hazardous
substances, but this liability is ancillary to the purview of ECRA.
Another apparently erroneous interpretation of ECRA was
made by the Senate Energy and Environmental Committee in its
published statement preceding the Act. The Committee states that
"any person who knowingly falsifies information required by this bill
would subject that person to a penalty of not more than $25,000.00
for each offense and to strict liability for all cleanup and removal
costs. ' 171 This statement suggests that employees and persons other
than managers and owners can be held liable under the Act. ECRA
Section 13:1K- 13(C), however, states that only owners and operators
of an industrial establishment may be held strictly liable for non-
compliance. Thus, an employee or individual other than an operator
or owner cannot be held strictly liable for intentional noncompliance.
Unfortunately, the terms "operator" and "owner" are not defined in
the Act. Therefore the extent of liability of management employees
is unclear. Even the term "owner" could be construed narrowly or
broadly. For instance, do the shareholders of a public corporation
covered by the Act constitute "owners" for purposes of strict
liability?
169. ECRA GUIDE, supra note 135, at preface (emphasis added). The terms "owner"
and "operator" are not defined in the statute nor in the interim regulations. But any action to
broaden these terms to include a landowner leasing property to an industrial establishment
apparently would exceed the authority of ECRA.
170. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:lK-9(a)(b). Note, however, Section 13:IK-13(a), which au-
thorizes the transferee to void the sale of real property utilized by an industrial establishment.
171. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-6 (emphasis added).
V. Unanswered Questions
A. Interpreting the Act
ECRA will have a profound impact on New Jersey because it
affects a vast range of property transactions. Several questions, how-
ever, remain unanswered. These questions regard the scope of
ECRA and its effect on many who contemplate property transfers in
New Jersey.
When an approved cleanup plan is implemented and completed
the NJDEP will inspect the premises. If the Department is satisfied
that the property meets its minimum standards, it will certify that
the site is detoxified.1 7' This, however, leaves unanswered the ques-
tion of who will assume liability if, several years down the road, pol-
lution begins to emanate from the property. ECRA states that no
provision of the Act shall be "construed to limit, restrict, or prohibit
the department from directing site cleanup under any other statute,
rule, or regulation. '1 7 This suggests that the NJDEP could impose
liability upon the transferor or transferee under other statutory or
common law theories of liability, including the Spill Act.1740ne pur-
pose of ECRA is to reduce the uncertainty of liability surrounding
property transfers. It can be argued that for the statute to fulfill that
purpose, certification of detoxification should relieve the transferor of
any responsibility for subsequent problems. If the NJDEP thor-
oughly inspects a property and has the opportunity to identify any
potential problems prior to certification, the transferor naturally will
rely on this certification and discontinue further investigations and
cleanup efforts. To impose liability upon a transferor who has rea-
sonably relied on the certification of the NJDEP and who sincerely
attempted to comply with the Act seems unfair. Of course, a con-
trary argument can be made that since approval of cleanup plans
and declarations is based substantially upon information disclosed to
the NJDEP by the industrial establishment, and since, absent
ECRA, the owners or operators could be held liable for leaching
wastes under other theories anyway, the fact that the NJDEP in-
spects and certifies a site should not serve as an estoppel when undis-
covered wastes later pollute.
It is unclear whether the transferee could escape liability by
voiding the sale under the provisions of ECRA itself. Though it ap-
172. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 1-3.12(e)(2) (pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-
10(c)).
173. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-II(c). See also N.J. Admin. Code tit. 7, § 1-3.21.
174. See supra notes 77-82, 119-22 and accompanying text. The surety bond required
by the Act and regulations only covers proper completion of the approved cleanup plans. N.J,
Stat. Ann. § 13:1K-9(a)(2) and N.J. Admin. Code tit. 7, § 1-3.13. The problem arises when
the cleanup plan itself was not adequate.
pears no statutory time limitation is placed upon a transferee's right
to void a transfer, if the NJDEP approved the transferor's cleanup
plan, it is doubtful that the transferee could void the sale by alleging
the transferor's noncompliance with the Act. Similarly, certification
of detoxification by the NJDEP serves as an assurance to potential
buyers that the site is free from waste problems. Thus, certification
by the NJDEP encourages the sale of the property. It would be un-
just to hold transferees liable for contaminated property when they
relied upon the certification given by the NJDEP in purchasing the
property.
Creation of a fund similar to CERCLA's "Post-Closure Liabil-
ity Fund ' 175 could alleviate these types of problems. The fund would
assume liability for cleanup of pollution discovered subsequent to a
NJDEP-certified closure or transfer. The fund could be financed by
a tax on industrial establishments. Although critics have alleged that
taxation of industrial establishments discourages the establishments
from operating in New Jersey, one legislator has stated that "no tax,
unless particularly oppressive, can drive out a large industrial or
commercial concern, which looks principally to transportation acces-
sibility, energy availability, and marketing potential when locating
its operations.' 
76
Another question left unanswered by the Act is whether the leg-
islature intended to impose liability for cleanup upon lessee indus-
trial establishments when the lessor sells the leased property to a
third party. Arguably, the Act applies in such situations because its
purpose is to insure "that the closing of operations and the transfer
of real property utilized for the generation, handling, storage and
disposal of hazardous substances and wastes . . . be conducted in a
rational and orderly way." 1" In support of this argument is a provi-
sion in the Act allowing the transferee to void "the sale or transfer of
an industrial establishment or any real property utilized in connec-
tion therewith' 78 if the transferor fails to comply with provisions of
the Act. Nonetheless, duties created under the Act are imposed upon
the "owner" or "operator" of an industrial establishment planning to
close or transfer operations.17 9 Therefore, the term "transferor" as
used in the "voidance" language above must refer only to owners or
operators of industrial establishments. Hence, an industrial establish-
ment should incur no duties under ECRA if the lessor, and not the
industrial establishment itself, transfers ownership of the property
175. See supra note 94.
176. Lesniak, supra note 82, at 44.
177. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-7 (emphasis added).
178. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-13(a) (emphasis added).
179. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-9(a)(b).
upon which the business conducts operations. 8 °
B. Constitutional Issues
ECRA represents a vigorous use of the police power to promote
public health and safety. The police power "enables 'civil society' to
respond in an appropriate and effective fashion to changing political,
economic, and social circumstances."181 Although government can
invoke this power to impose new costs on property ownership, there
are constitutional limits to the power.1 8 2 In several instances, ECRA
walks the thin line between constitutional and unconstitutional use of
the police power.
1. Successor Liability Under ECRA.-The impact of ECRA
can be quite severe on an industrial establishment that, prior to en-
actment of ECRA, innocently acquired property upon which was de-
posited hazardous substances not used by the industrial establish-
ment in its operations. ECRA will impose liability on the otherwise
blameless industrial establishment for the cleanup of stored or
dumped substances prior to closure or transfer of operations. This
imposition of liability may be unconstitutionally oppressive when the
current owner lacked knowledge of the problem prior to and after
acquiring the property and has since engaged in operations different
from those of the seller.183 When the industrial establishment's oper-
ations are in no way connected with the waste, ECRA apparently
imposes liability on the basis of mere ownership. The maverick the-
ory espoused in United States v. Price""' might support an action
against the industrial establishment based upon ownership alone.
The Price decision, however, has been rejected in most subsequent
decisions. Furthermore, Price is distinguishable from the imposition
of liability on an entirely blameless actor. The Price court sought to
punish landowners who knew that their land contained substances
presently polluting the environment and yet failed to act. Because
the owners were aware of the present harm their conduct was culpa-
ble. On the other hand, ECRA, read literally, burdens industrial es-
tablishments, regardless of their knowledge, with the removal of all
180. For a discussion of whether a lessor of property can be held liable, if his "industrial
establishment" lessee fails to comply with ECRA, see supra text accompanying note 170.
181. National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth Dep't of Env't Resources, 489
Pa. 221, 232, 414 A.2d 37, 42 (1978).
182. The United States Supreme Court has discussed the constitutional limits of a
state's police power. "To justify the state in interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it
must appear, - first, that the interests of the public . . . require such interference; and sec-
ond, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals." Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
183. Id.
184. 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981). See supra note 105.
hazardous waste even though the waste is contained and is not pol-
luting the surrounding environment. Thus, ECRA places liability
upon less culpable conduct in an attempt to address a less urgent
and less harmful situation than that involved in Price.
In United States v. Exxon, 85 the New Jersey Superior Court
held that mere ownership is not enough to impose liability on a land-
owner for hazardous substances deposited on his land. Similarly, in
State v. Ventron,1 86 the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that
the current owner of a hazardous waste site could not be held liable
if he did not in some way contribute to the pollution. Though these
courts were considering liability under other statutes, the reasoning
offered in those decisions indicates that imposition of liability solely
on the basis of ownership would not be supported in the courts.
The NJDEP is cognizant of this problem but contends that
ECRA is a "site-specific" regulation. In' other words, cleanup liabil-
ity is akin to an encumbrance or title defect that "runs with the
land." Thus, current owners are held liable by the Act but can pur-
sue private legal actions against the transferor or generator of the
waste. "'87 The Act, however, burdens only those who engage in activ-
ity characteristic of an "industrial establishment." This suggests that
ECRA is really more of an "activity-specific"' 188 regulation and that
the legislature intended to impose liability only on those who actu-
ally use the stored or dumped hazardous substances in their
operations.
Perhaps the NJDEP could successfully argue that because the
"industrial establishment" by definition carries on operations involv-
ing hazardous substances, it has sufficiently associated it with its
predecessor's hazardous wastes to be rendered liable for their re-
moval. 189 It would be difficult, however, for the NJDEP to argue
that this is an appropriate extension of enterprise liability because
the current owner has not used the waste for profit. A corporate suc-
cessor theory would also be difficult to argue because the current
owner is not engaged in the same manufacturing operations. 90 Thus,
it appears that the Act imposes liability on the basis of ownership in
this instance and, therefore, may be unconstitutionally oppressive.
Certainly "ownership has no more relationship to the problems of
pollution than did the theory of privity of contract to the problems of
185. 151 N.J. Super. 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (1977).
186. 94 N.J. 254, 463 A.2d 893 (1983).
187. 16 N.J. Admin. Reg. at 526, No. 25.
188. This term is derived from a telephone interview with Mark Smith, Research Assis-
tant, New Jersey Office of Legislative Services (October 11, 1984).
189. See supra note 106.
190. See supra note 127.
products liability."' 91
2. ECRA and the Bankruptcy Code.-Other issues warranting
analysis concern the application of ECRA to a trustee in bankruptcy
when property of the bankrupt estate qualifies as an "industrial es-
tablishment." The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978192 was enacted
generally "to provide for an equitable settling of creditor's accounts
by usurping from the debtor his power to control the distribution of
his assets."'1 93 ECRA was enacted to protect the citizens and envi-
ronment of New Jersey from the harmful effects of improperly con-
trolled hazardous substances. 9 A conflict between these two policies
may result when ECRA is triggered by a sale of the bankrupt es-
tate's assets. Although a state's police power is broadly construed in
order to effectuate legitimate public policy, federal law always
preempts state law when the two conflict.
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The initial question for resolution is whether ECRA is actually
preempted in its entirety by federal bankruptcy law when it is ap-
plied against property of a bankrupt's estate. This issue was ad-
dressed in In Re Borne Chemical, Inc.,19 the only bankruptcy litiga-
tion involving ECRA to date. In Borne Chemical, the debtor in
possession pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code sought to
prevent the application of ECRA to a proposed sale of its property.
The property in question, described as parcels "A" and "B," was
littered with hazardous waste that greatly decreased its market
value. The court concluded that ECRA was neither explicitly nor
implicitly preempted by the Bankruptcy Code and that application
of ECRA would not undermine the purpose of the Code.197 It there-
fore conditioned the sale of Borne's property on compliance with
ECRA.' 198 In response, Borne sought orders authorizing abandon-
ment of Parcel B and cessation of operations on Parcel A, without
regard to ECRA. 199
The court turned to the Bankruptcy Code for guidance, address-
ing first the issue of whether Borne could ignore ECRA regulations
and abandon Parcel B as burdensome to the bankrupt's estate pursu-
191. Exxon, 151 N.J. Super. at 485, 376 A.2d at 1350.
192. Act No. 6, 1978, P.L. 95-598, Title 1, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §
101 (1979)).
193. In re Quanta Resources, 739 F.2d 912, 915 (1984) (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted
sub. nom. O'Neil v. City of New York, 105 S. Ct. 1168 (1985) (Quanta I).
194. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-7.
195. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971) (setting forth a two-step process
for determining preemption questions: first, construe the statutes to discover their purposes;
second, determine if state law interferes with the objectives of federal law).
196. No. 80-00495, slip op. (Bankr. D.N.J. March 15, 1984).
197. Id. at 5-10.
198. Id. at 11.
199. No. 80-00495, slip op. (Bankr. D.N.J. May 9, 1984).
ant to 11 U.S.C. § 554(a). This provision states that "[aifter notice
and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate
that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value
and benefit to the estate."2 0 Finding Parcel B burdensome to the
estate because of its environmental problems, the court adopted the
rationale of In re Quanta Resources201 and granted Borne's motion.
In Quanta, the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey held that burdensome property contaminated with hazardous
waste could be abandoned even though abandonment would violate
environmental statutes regulating the disposal of hazardous waste.
Although Quanta involved abandonment by a trustee in a Chapter 7
case, the Borne Chemical court concluded that the same rationale
applied in Chapter 11 proceedings. Thus, Borne's motion to abandon
Parcel B without complying with ECRA was granted. 2
The issue, however, is far from settled. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently overturned'the District
Court's decision in Quanta. The Court of Appeals concluded that
"enforcement of state public health and safety laws is not superseded
by the power of abandonment contained in section 554 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code."2 03 The court further noted in a companion case that
Congressional intent to withdraw police power from a state must be
unmistakable. 204 The Court of Appeals found no such expression of
legislative intent in the Bankruptcy Code. To the contrary, it found
evidence that Congress intended to accommodate state police power.
The court noted that the Code exempts from its automatic stay pro-
vision any action undertaken by a governmental unit to enforce po-
lice or regulatory powers.20 5 It found further evidence that the Code
was not intended to abrogate relevant state laws in 28 U.S.C. §
959(b), which states that a trustee or a debtor in possession "shall
manage and operate the property in his possession . . according to
200. Borne qualified as a trustee in bankruptcy under II U.S.C. § 1107.
201. No. 82-3524, slip op. (Bankr. D.N.J. Jan. 24, 1983).
202. Borne Chemical, No. 80-00495, slip op. at 6 (Bankr. D.N.J. May 9, 1984).
203. In re Quanta Resources, 739 F.2d 927, 929 (1984) (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. granted
sub. nom. Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,
105 S. Ct. 1168 (Quanta 11). The court adopted its rationale in the decision of a companion
Quanta case, which involved the state of New York. See in re Quanta Resources, 739 F.2d
912 (1984) (Quanta 1).
204. Quanta 1 739 F.2d at 916 (1984) (New York State was the appellant).
205. Upon filing a petition in bankruptcy under chapter 11, Section 362(a)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code operates to stay
the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the
debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the
case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before
the commencement of the case . . ..
II U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1982).
the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated. '208
The court, however, did not find that this provision expressly
requires a trustee to comply with state laws when abandoning prop-
erty. The court could not determine whether the language "manage
or operate" was limited to operations in the ordinary course of busi-
ness or extended to abandonment of property in liquidation proceed-
ings. 0 Nevertheless, it found the provision to be a clear indication
that the bankruptcy scheme was not intended to abrogate relevant
state laws.208 Finally, the court noted that bankruptcy proceedings
are equitable proceedings and therefore require a balancing of the
federal and state interests at issue. Balancing these interests in the
case then before it, the court declared that the state's interest in pro-
tecting the health and safety of its citizens outweighed any federal
interest in preserving the debtor's estate for distribution. Therefore,
the property in question could not be abandoned in a bankruptcy
proceeding absent compliance with state environmental laws.
20 9
The same reasoning is applicable to the Borne Chemical pro-
ceeding. Because the Borne Chemical court relied primarily on the
overruled decision of the District Court in Quanta,2 10 it is unlikely
that the Borne Chemical decision would survive on appeal.
The last issue considered by the Borne Chemical court was
whether Borne could cease operations on Parcel A without comply-
ing with ECRA. The court observed that the Code requires a debtor
in possession to manage and operate property in its possession in ac-
cordance with valid state laws. 21' Unlike the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Quanta, the court determined that
the Code requirement applies only when the property is being man-
aged or operated for the purpose of continuing operations. Noting
the severe losses being sustained on the property by the debtor, the
court sanctioned cessation of operations absent compliance with
ECRA.2 12 The court's decision on this issue as yet remains intact.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit never di-
rectly decided that issue in Quanta. Moreover, some authority does
exist for the court's conclusion. 1 But the Borne Chemical court did
206. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982).
207. Quanta 1, 739 F.2d at 919.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 921.
210. Borne Chemical, No. 80-00495, slip op. at 6 (Bankr. D.N.J. May 9, 1984).
211. See supra text accompanying note 206.
212. Borne Chemical, No. 80-00495, slip op. at 7 (Bankr. D.N.J. May 9, 1984).
213. In Missouri v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 647 F.2d 768, 788 n.18 (8th Cir.
1981) the court stated in dictum that a Chapter 11 trustee for a grain elevator would probably
not be prohibited from selling grain to liquidate assets notwithstanding that state law required
a license to sell grain. See also 7 MOORE & LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 1913 (2d
ed. 1982) (makes a similar distinction).
not attempt to balance state and federal interests, as was done in
Quanta. The NJDEP therefore could request that an equitable bal-
ancing of interests be made. Under the Quanta rationale, the state's
health and safety interests furthered by ECRA clearly outweigh the
federal interest in protecting creditors. Indeed, "Congress has re-
cently recognized in an express fashion its intention that public in-
terest regulations are to outweigh that of the Bankruptcy Act and
Rules in the case of conflict."""4
VI. ECRA's Significance
ECRA is an effective and innovative use of state police power.
It is effective because it ensures cleanup of hazardous substances
within the control of responsible parties. It is innovative because it
imposes liability not to remedy the effects of pollution but to prevent
pollution. The need for ECRA is evidenced by the tremendous ex-
penditure of dollars for the cleanup of soil, surface water and
groundwater contamination caused by improperly controlled hazard-
ous waste.215 This need is further evidenced by the explosion of liti-
gation in which plaintiffs seek to impose liability on unwitting pur-
chasers of real estate for damage caused by the hazardous waste
disposal practices of prior landowners. 16 Finally, the need is evi-
denced most poignantly by the diminished quality of life for those
who suffer from the improper handling of toxic substances. 1
ECRA can be readily compared to home buyer protection pro-
grams. These programs are premised on the belief that persons re-
sponsible for creating problems must also be responsible for cor-
recting them.
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Most importantly, ECRA is not a new statutory theory of tort
recovery. It seeks to prevent injury rather than remedy it. The Act,
in effect, creates an "activity specific" theory of liability that extends
beyond the realm of tort. The cost of cleanup is placed upon those
who profit from the use of hazardous substances regardless of
whether they actually deposited the hazardous substances upon the
site and regardless of whether an injury has occurred.21 9 As under an
enterprise liability theory, the business charged with the cleanup can
214. In re Canarico Quarries, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1333 (D.P.R. 1979) (citing section
362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code).
215. See Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 37 (estimated costs of needed cleanup na-
tionwide are between 26.2 and 44.1 billion dollars).
216. See Justice's Hazardous Waste Prosecutor Expects to File 100 New Cases This
Year, [1979-1980 File Binder] 10 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2243 (1980).
217. See Council on Environmental Quality, Carcinogens in the Environment, in Toxic
TORTS 69, 87-89 (P. Rheingold, N. Landau & M. Canavan eds. 1977).
218. See ECRA GUIDE, supra note 135, at 1.
219. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
pass the expense along to its customers as a cost of doing business.
Also, the industrial establishment is better informed and, thus, better
able to control the disposal of hazardous substances located on its
property. In fact, ECRA requires in its initial notice and cleanup
provisions that locations, quantities and types of hazardous sub-
stances be specifically enumerated.
22 0
ECRA's approach is both economically and environmentally su-
perior to tort theories of recovery because it emphasizes prevention
rather than compensation. Tort theories, on the other hand, are inef-
fective unless an actual injury occurs.21
It costs much more to remedy the effects of hazardous waste
contamination than to prevent it. 222 Regardless of whether govern-
ment or defendant pays cleanup costs, the expenditure of funds on a
remedial rather than a preventive program amounts to a decrease in
productivity and service to the community, thus creating economic
waste. Even though insurance is available for the private defendant,
funds diverted to insurance premiums are rendered unproductive.
Perhaps it would cost less for the industrial establishment to pay
these premiums and utilize inexpensive and improper disposal meth-
ods. This practice, however, is detrimental to the economy as a whole
because the insurance company or the public must expend funds on
unproductive cleanup.
Moreover, merely cleaning up the immediate cause of the dam-
age is not the most efficient means of controlling hazardous waste. It
may take years and even decades before contaminated property
again becomes habitable and useful. 223 This prolonged period of re-
covery amounts to economic waste and hinders the public policy
favoring the maximum utilization of resources. Because ECRA seeks
to prevent property damage from ever occurring, it furthers the max-
imum utilization policy. ECRA is activated by the closure or trans-
fer of operations rather than by injury. Thus, cleanup procedures are
implemented at relatively little cost while the hazardous substances
are still closely controlled. As a result, fewer resources are expended
on unproductive activities.
Additionally, ECRA is superior to remedial approaches because
the evidentiary problems which hinder tort actions are nonexistent.
220. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 1-3.7.
221. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
222. "[T]he estimated costs associated with the hazardous waste dump at the Love Ca-
nal in Niagara Falls, New York reveal a typical pattern: avoidance costs of $4 million, abate-
ment costs of $125 million and compensation costs suggested by the more than $2.5 billion in
claims for personal injury." Note, Allocating the Costs of Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94
HARV. L. REV. 584, 586 (1981). See also Proper Hazardous Waste Disposal is Cheaper, EPA
Administrator Says, 9 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2082 (1979) (noting the Love Canal incident).
223. See generally M. BROWN, LAYING WASTE, 3-96 (1980).
Under remedial tort theories, the injured party must produce suffi-
cient evidence concerning the source of the pollution,2  the parties
responsible for the pollution225 and the apportionment of liability
among those parties. 2 Under ECRA, there can be no transfer or
closure of operations without NJDEP approval. The problems associ-
ated with successor liability therefore do not exist.227 Because only
owners and operators of industrial establishments are liable for
cleanup, few problems arise regarding apportionment of damages.
ECRA's significance centers on its preventative approach to en-
vironmental control. This approach is free from the kind of eviden-
tiary problems and exorbitant costs that plague remedial theories of
recovery.
VII. Conclusion
ECRA is the result of a legislative determination that "society's
interest in determining the improper disposal of hazardous wastes
and in alleviating serious hazards as quickly as possible mandate
that those responsible for the disposal of such wastes not be able to
shirk their statutory responsibilities by simply selling the property in
which the wastes are stored."22 8 The Act complements other New
Jersey environmental legislation because it operates to prevent haz-
ardous waste pollution, which is remedied by the Spill Act,2 9 and
encourages safe and orderly disposal of hazardous substances in
properly controlled disposal facilities, which are regulated by the
Solid Waste Management Act230 and the Hazardous Waste Facili-
ties Siting Act.23 1
ECRA is superior to statutory and common law tort theories
because it does more than merely provide an after-the-fact remedy
for injuries that are clearly preventable. Although the statute ap-
pears harsh when applied in certain situations, its aggregate effect
will be a reduction in government and private expenditures on unpro-
ductive remedial cleanup programs.
The statute raises some important questions that must be ad-
dressed by the legislature or, ultimately, by the courts. The legisla-
ture should attempt to define certain ambiguous terms used in the
Act, such as "owner" and "operator." In addition, it should consider
224. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
225. For a discussion of successor liability see supra notes 96-133 and accompanying
text.
226. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
227. But see supra notes 183-191 and accompanying text.
228. Price, 523 F. Supp. at 1072.
229. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.11(a)-(z) (West 1982 & Supp. 1984-85).
230. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1E-l-42 (West 1979 & Supp. 1984-85).
231. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:IE-49 (West Supp. 1984-85).
developing a post-cleanup liability fund to resolve the issue of liabil-
ity for wastes discovered subsequent to the completion of an ap-
proved cleanup plan.
Nonetheless, ECRA encourages businesses to run their opera-
tions safely and efficiently. It furthers the public policy of maximiz-
ing the use of resources by preventing the kinds of pollution that
damage and destroy the utility of property. In the final analysis, the
Act is a model environmental statute worthy of emulation in other
jurisdictions.
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